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Abstract
While progress has been made in understanding the robustness of machine learn-
ing classifiers to test-time adversaries (evasion attacks), fundamental questions
remain unresolved. In this paper, we use optimal transport to characterize the
minimum possible loss in an adversarial classification scenario. In this setting,
an adversary receives a random labeled example from one of two classes, per-
turbs the example subject to a neighborhood constraint, and presents the modified
example to the classifier. We define an appropriate cost function such that the min-
imum transportation cost between the distributions of the two classes determines
the minimum 0 − 1 loss for any classifier. When the classifier comes from a re-
stricted hypothesis class, the optimal transportation cost provides a lower bound.
We apply our framework to the case of Gaussian data with norm-bounded adver-
saries and explicitly show matching bounds for the classification and transport
problems as well as the optimality of linear classifiers. We also characterize the
sample complexity of learning in this setting, deriving and extending previously
known results as a special case. Finally, we use our framework to study the gap be-
tween the optimal classification performance possible and that currently achieved
by state-of-the-art robustly trained neural networks for datasets of interest, namely,
MNIST, Fashion MNIST and CIFAR-10.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) has become ubiquitous due to its impressive performance in a wide variety
of domains such as image recognition [48, 72], natural language and speech processing [22, 25, 37],
game-playing [12, 59, 71] and aircraft collision avoidance [42]. This ubiquity, however, provides
adversaries with both the opportunity and incentive to strategically fool machine learning systems
during both the training (poisoning attacks) [5,9,40,60,67] and test (evasion attacks) [8,17,34,57,58,
63, 77] phases. In an evasion attack, an adversary adds imperceptible perturbations to inputs in the
test phase to cause misclassification. A large number of adversarial example-based evasion attacks
have been proposed against ML algorithms used for tasks such as image classification [8, 17, 19, 34,
63, 77], object detection [21, 53, 83], image segmentation [2, 31] and speech recognition [18, 86];
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generative models for image data [45] and even reinforcement learning algorithms [38, 46]. These
attacks have been carried out in black-box [7, 11, 20, 52, 61, 62, 77] as well as in physical settings
[29, 49, 70, 74].
A wide variety of defenses based on adversarial training [34,54,78], input de-noising through trans-
formations [6, 24, 28, 69, 84], distillation [65], ensembling [1, 4, 75] and feature nullification [81]
were proposed to defend ML algorithms against evasion attacks, only for most to be rendered inef-
fective by stronger attacks [3, 14–16]. Iterative adversarial training [54] is a current state-of-the-art
empirical defense. Recently, defenses that rely on adversarial training and are provably robust to
small perturbations have been proposed [35, 44, 66, 73] but are unable to achieve good generaliza-
tion behavior on standard datasets such as CIFAR-10 [47]. In spite of an active line of research
that has worked to characterize the difficulty of learning in the presence of evasion adversaries by
analyzing the sample complexity of learning classifiers for known distributions [68] as well as in the
distribution-free setting [23, 56, 85], fundamental questions remain unresolved. One such question
is, what is the behavior of the optimal achievable loss in the presence of an adversary?
In this paper, we derive bounds on the 0−1 loss of classifiers while classifying adversariallymodified
data at test time, which is often referred to as adversarial robustness. We first develop a framework
that relates classification in the presence of an adversary and optimal transport with an appropriately
defined adversarial cost function. For an arbitrary data distribution with two classes, we characterize
optimal adversarial robustness in terms of the transportation distance between the classes. When
the classifier comes from a restricted hypothesis class, we obtain a lower bound on the minimum
possible 0 − 1 loss (or equivalently, an upper bound on the maximum possible classification accu-
racy).
We then consider the case of a mixture of two Gaussians and derive matching upper and lower
bounds for adversarial robustness by framing it as a convex optimization problem and proving the
optimality of linear classifiers. For an ℓ∞ adversary, we also present the explicit solution for this
optimization problem and analyze its properties. Further, we derive an expression for sample com-
plexity with the assumption of a Gaussian prior on the mean of the Gaussians which allows us to
independently match and extend the results from Schmidt et al. [68] as a special case.
Finally, in our experiments, we find transportation costs between the classes of empirical distri-
butions of interest such as MNIST [50], Fashion-MNIST [82] and CIFAR-10 [47] for adversaries
bounded by ℓ2 and ℓ∞ distance constraints, and relate them to the classification loss of state-of-the-
art robust classifiers. Our results demonstrate that as the adversarial budget increases, the gap be-
tween current robust classifiers and the lower bound increases. This effect is especially pronounced
for the CIFAR-10 dataset, providing a clear indication of the difficulty of robust classification for
this dataset.
What do these results imply? First, the effectiveness of any defense for a given dataset can be
directly analyzed by comparing its robustness to the lower bound. In particular, this allows us to
identify regimes of interest where robust classification is possible. Our bound can be used to decide
whether a particular adversarial budget is big or small. Second, since our lower bound does not
require any distributional assumptions on the data, we are able to directly apply it to empirical
distributions, characterizing whether robust classification is possible.
Further, in the Gaussian setting, the optimal classifier in the adversarial case depends explicitly on
the adversary’s budget. The optimal classifier in the benign case (corresponding to a budget of
0), differs from that for non-zero budgets. This immediately establishes a trade-off between the
benign accuracy and adversarial robustness achievable with a given classifier. This raises interesting
questions about which classifier should actually be deployed and how large the trade-off is. From the
explicit solution we derive in the Gaussian setting, we observe that non-robust features occur during
classification due to a mismatch between the norms used by the adversary and that governing the data
distribution. We expand upon this observation in Section 4.1, which was also made independently
by Ilyas et al. [39].
Contributions: We summarize our contributions in this paper as follows: i) we develop a framework
for finding general lower bounds for classification error in the presence of an adversary (adversarial
robustness) using optimal transport, ii) we show matching upper and lower bounds for adversarial
robustness as well as the sample complexity of attaining it for the case of Gaussian data and a convex,
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origin-symmetric constraint on the adversary and iii) we determine lower bounds on adversarial
robustness for empirical datasets of interest and compare them to those of robustly trained classifiers.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
In this section, we set up the problem of learning in the presence of an evasion adversary. Such
an adversary presents the learner with adversarially modified examples at test time but does not
interfere with the training process [17, 34, 77]. We also define notation for the rest of the paper and
explain how other work on adversarial examples fits into our setting.
Symbol Usage
X Space of natural examples
X˜ Space of examples produced by the adversary
N : X → 2X˜ Neighborhood constraint function for adversary
P Distribution of labeled examples (on X × {−1, 1})
Table 1: Basic notation for the adversarial learning problem
We summarize the basic notation in Table 1. We now formally describe the learning prob-
lem. There is an unknown P ∈ P(X × {−1, 1}). The learner receives labeled training data
(x,y) = ((x0, y0), . . . , (xn−1, yn−1)) ∼ Pn and must select a hypothesis h. The evasion adversary
receives a labeled natural example (xTest, yTest) ∼ P and selects x˜ ∈ N(xTest), the set of adversarial
examples in the neighborhood of xTest. The adversary gives x˜ to the learner and the learner must
estimate yTest. Their performance is measured by the 0-1 loss, ℓ(yTest, h(x˜)).
Examples produced by the adversary are elements of a space X˜ . In most applications, X = X˜ , but
we find it useful to distinguish them to clarify some definitions. We requireN(x) to be nonempty so
some choice of x˜ is always available. By taking X = X˜ and N(x) = {x}, we recover the standard
problem of learning without an adversary. If N1, N2 are neighborhood functions and N1(x) ⊆
N2(x) for all x ∈ X , N2 represents a stronger adversary. When X = X˜ , a neighborhood function
N can be defined using a distance d on X and an adversarial constraint β: N(x) = {x˜ : d(x, x˜) ≤
β}. This provides an ordered family of adversaries of varying strengths used in previous work
[17, 34, 68].
The learner’s error rate under the data distribution P with an adversary constrained by the neighbor-
hood functionN is L(N,P, h) = E(x,y)∼P [maxx˜∈N(x) ℓ(h(x˜), y)].
3 Adversarial Robustness from Optimal transport
In this section, we explain the connections between adversarially robust classification and optimal
transport. At a high level, these arise from the following idea: if a pair of examples, one from
each class, are adversarially indistinguishable, then any hypothesis can classify at most one of the
examples correctly, By finding families of such pairs, one can obtain lower bounds on classification
error rate. When the set of available hypotheses is as large as possible, the best of these lower
bounds is tight.
Section Roadmap: We will first review some basic concepts from optimal transport theory [80].
Then, we will define a cost function for adversarial classification as well as its associated potential
functions that are needed to establish Kantorovich duality. We show how a coupling between the
conditional distributions of the two classes can be obtained by composing couplings derived from the
adversarial strategy and the total variation distance, which links hypothesis testing and transportation
costs. Finally, we show that the potential functions have an interpretation in terms of classification,
which leads to our theorem connecting adversarial robustness to the optimal transport cost.
3.1 Basic definitions from optimal transport
In this section, we use capital letters for random variables and lowercase letters for points in spaces.
Couplings A coupling between probability distributions PX on X and PY on Y is a joint distribu-
tion on X × Y with marginals PX and PY . Let Π(PX , PY ) be the set of such couplings.
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Definition 1 (Optimal transport cost). For a cost function c : X × Y → R ∪ {+∞} and marginal
distributions PX and PY , the optimal transport cost is
C(PX , PY ) = inf
PXY ∈Π(PX ,PY )
E(X,Y )∼PXY [c(X,Y )]. (1)
Potential functions and Kantorovich duality There is a dual characterization of optimal trans-
port cost in terms of potential functions which we use to make the connection between the transport
and classification problems.
Definition 2 (Potential functions). Functions f : X → R and g : Y → R are potential functions
for the cost c if g(y)− f(x) ≤ c(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
A pair of potential functions provide a one-dimensional representation of the spaces X and Y . This
representation must be be faithful to the cost structure on the original spaces: if a pair of points (x, y)
are close in transportation cost, then f(x) must be close to g(y). In the dual optimization problem
for optimal transport cost, we search for a representation that separates PX from PY as much as
possible:
C(PX , PY ) = sup
f,g
EY∼PY [g(Y )]− EX∼PX [f(X)]. (2)
For any choices of f , g, and PXY , it is clear that E[g(Y )] − E[f(X)] ≤ E[c(X,Y )]. Kantorovich
duality states that there are in fact choices for f and g that attain equality.
Define the dual of f relative to c to be f c(y) = infx c(x, y) + f(x). This is the largest function that
forms a potential for c when paired with with f . In (2), it is sufficient to optimize over pairs (f, f c).
Compositions The composition of cost functions c : X × Y → R and c′ : Y × Z → R is
(c ◦ c′) : X × Z → R (c ◦ c′)(x, z) = inf
y∈Y
c(x, y) + c′(y, z).
The composition of optimal transport costs can be defined in two equivalent ways:
(C ◦ C′)(PX , PZ) = inf
PY
C(PX , PY ) + C
′(PY , PZ) = inf
PXZ
E[(c ◦ c′)(X,Z)]
Total variation distance The total variation distance between distributions P andQ is
CTV(P,Q) = sup
A
P (A)−Q(A). (3)
We use this notation because it is the optimal transport cost for the cost function cTV : X ×X → R,
cTV(x, x
′) = 1[x 6= x′]. Observe that (3) is equivalent to (2) with the additional restrictions that
f(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all x, i.e. f is an indicator function for some set A and g = f cTV .
For binary classification with a symmetric prior on the classes, a set A that achieves the optimum in
Eq. (3) corresponds to an optimal test for distinguishing P fromQ.
3.2 Adversarial cost functions and couplings
We now construct specialized version of costs and couplings that translate between robust classifica-
tion and optimal transport.
Cost functions for adversarial classification The adversarial constraint information N can be
encoded into the following cost function cN : X × X˜ → R: cN (x, x˜) = 1[x˜ 6∈ N(x)]. The com-
position of cN and c⊤N (i.e. cN with the arguments flipped) has simple combinatorial interpretation:
(cN ◦ c⊤N )(x, x′) = 1[N(x) ∩N(x′) = ∅].
Perhaps the most well-known example of optimal transport is the earth-mover’s or 1-Wasserstein
distance, where the cost function is a metric on the underlying space. In general, the transportation
cost cN ◦ c⊤N is not a metric on X because (cN ◦ c⊤N)(x, x′) = 0 does not necessarily imply x = x′.
However, when (cN ◦ c⊤N )(x, x′) = 0, we say that the points are adversarially indistinguishible.
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Couplings from adversarial strategies Let a : X → X˜ be a function such that a(x) ∈ N(x)
for all x ∈ X . Then a is an admissible adversarial perturbation strategy. The adversarial
expected risk can be expressed as a maximization over adversarial strategies: L(N,P, h) =
supa1,a−1 E(x,c)∼P [ℓ(h(ac(x)), c)]. Let X˜1 = a1(X1), so a1 gives a coupling PX1X˜1 between
PX1 and PX˜1 . By construction, CN (PX1 , PX˜1) = 0. A general coupling between PX1 and PX˜1
with CN (PX1 , PX˜1) = 0 corresponds to a randomized adversarial strategy.
We define PX˜−1 and PX−1X˜−1 analogously. By composing the adversarial strategy couplingPX1X˜1 ,
the total variation coupling of PX˜1 and PX˜−1 , and PX˜−1X−1 , we obtain a coupling PX1X−1 .
X˜
PX˜−1 PX˜1
h(x) = −1 h(x) = 1
X
PX−1 PX1
h˜(x) = −1 h˜(x) = ⊥ h˜(x) = 1
0
1
f
g
Figure 1: The relationships between a classifier
h : X → {1,−1}, a degraded classifier h˜ : X˜ →
{1,−1,⊥}, and potential functions f, g : X → R.
Potential functions from classifiers Nowwe
can explore the relationship between transport
and classification. Consider a given hypoth-
esis h : X˜ → {−1, 1}. A labeled adver-
sarial example (x˜, y) is classified correctly if
x˜ ∈ h−1(y). A labeled example (x, y) is clas-
sified correctly if N(x) ⊆ h−1(y). Following
Cullina et al. [23], we define degraded hypothe-
ses h˜ : X → {−1, 1,⊥},
h˜(x) =
{
y : N(x) ⊆ h−1(y)
⊥ : otherwise.
This allows us to express the adversarial classi-
fication accuracy of h, 1− L(N, h, P ), as
1
2
(E[1[h˜(X1) = 1]] + E[1[h˜(X−1) = −1]]).
Observe that 1[h˜(x) = 1] + 1[h˜(x′) = −1] ≤
(cN ◦ c⊤N )(x, x′) + 1. Thus the functions f(x) = 1 − 1[h˜(x) = 1] and g(x) = 1[h˜(x) = −1] are
admissible potentials for cN ◦ c⊤N . This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Our first theorem characterizes optimal adversarial robustness when h is allowed to be any classifier.
Theorem 1. Let X and X˜ be Polish spaces and let N : X → 2X˜ be an upper-hemicontinuous
neighborhood function such thatN(x) is nonempty and closed for all x. For any pair of distributions
PX1 ,PX−1 on X ,
(CN ◦ C⊤N )(PX1 , PX−1) = 1− 2 inf
h
L(N, h, P )
where h : X˜ → {1,−1} can be any measurable function. Furthermore there is some h that achieves
the infimum.
In the case of finite spaces, this theorem is essentially equivalent to the König-Egerváry theorem on
size of a maximum matching in a bipartite graph. The full proof is in Section A of the Appendix.
If instead of all measurable functions, we consider h ∈ H, a smaller hypothesis class, Theorem 1
provides a lower bound on infh∈H L(N, h, P ).
4 Gaussian data: Optimal loss
In this section, we consider the case when the data is generated from a mixture of two Gaussians with
identical covariances and means that differ in sign. Directly applying (1) or (2), requires optimizing
over either all classifiers or all transportation plans. However, a classifier and a coupling that achieve
the same cost must both be optimal. We use this to show that optimizing over linear classifiers and
‘translate and pair’ transportation plans characterizes adversarial robustness in this case.
Problem setup: Consider a labeled example (X,Y ) ∈ Rd×{−1, 1} such that the exampleX has
a Gaussian conditional distribution,X |(Y = y) ∼ N (yµ,Σ), and Pr(Y = 1) = Pr(Y = −1) = 12 .
5
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
α
∗ (
β
,x
)
β
α∗(β,x), d = 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
α
∗ (
β
,x
)
β
α∗(β, x), d = 1000
Figure 2: Variation in α∗ w.r.t. β for an ℓ∞ adversary with d = 10 (left) and d = 1000 (right). α∗
is the point at which the primal transport problem and the dual classification problem have matching
solutions, given by 1− 2Q(α∗). The classification loss at this point is simply Q(α∗).
Let B ⊆ Rd be a closed, convex, absorbing, origin-symmetric set. The adversary is constrained to
add perturbations to a data point x contained within βB, where β is an adversarial budget parameter.
That is, for all x, N(x) = x + βB. This includes ℓp-constrained adversaries as the special case
B = {z : ‖z‖p ≤ 1}. For N and P of this form, we will determine infh L(N,P, h) where h can be
any measurable function.
We first define the following convex optimization problem in order to state Theorem 2. In the proof
of Theorem 2, it will become clear how it arises.
Definition 3. Let α∗(β, µ) be the solution to the following convex optimization problem:
(z, y, α) ∈ Rd+d+1 minα s.t. ‖y‖Σ ≤ α ‖z‖B ≤ β z + y = µ (4)
where we use the seminorms ‖y‖Σ =
√
y⊤Σ−1y and ‖z‖B = inf{β : z ∈ βB}.
Theorem 2. Let N(x) = x + βB. Then (CN ◦ C⊤N )(N (µ,Σ),N (−µ,Σ)) = 1 − 2Q(α∗(β, µ)),
where Q is the complementary cumulative distribution function for N (0, 1).
The crucial properties of the solution to (4) are characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let µ ∈ Rd, β ≥ 0, and α = α∗(β, x). There are y, z, w ∈ Rd such that y + z = µ and
‖y‖Σ = α ‖z‖B = β ‖w‖Σ∗ = 1 ‖w‖B∗ = γ w⊤y = α w⊤z = βγ.
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Section B.1 of the Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 2. We start from the definition of optimal transport cost and consider the restricted
class of “translate and pair in place” couplings to get an upper bound. In these couplings, the
adversarial attacks are translations by a constant: X˜1 = X1 + z and X˜−1 = X−1 − z. The total
variation coupling between X˜1 and X˜−1 does “pairing in place”.
(CN ◦ C⊤N )(PX1 , PX−1) ≤ inf
z∈βB
CTV (PX˜1 , PX˜−1) = infz∈βB
sup
w
2Q
(
w⊺z − w⊺µ√
w⊺Σw
)
− 1.
The full computation of the total variation between Gaussians is in Section B.2 of the Appendix..
The infimum is attained at w∗ = 2Σ−1(z − µ) and its value is√(z − µ)⊺Σ−1(z − µ). The choice
of z from Lemma 1 makes the upper bound 2Q(−α∗(β, µ))− 1 = 1− 2Q(α∗(β, µ)).
Now we consider the lower bounds on optimal transport cost from linear classification functions
of the form fw(x) = sgn (w⊺x). In the presence of an adversary, the classification problem
becomes maxw P(x,y)∼P [fw(x + aw,y(x)) = y] . When y = 1, the correct classification event is
fw(x + aw,1(x)) = 1, or equivalently w⊺x− β‖w‖B∗ > 0. This ultimately gives the lower bound
(CN ◦ C⊤N )(PX1 , PX−1 ) ≥ sup
w
1− 2Q
(
β‖w‖B∗ − w⊺µ
‖w‖Σ∗
)
. (5)
The full calculation appears in the Appendix material (Section B.3). From Lemma 1, there is a
choice of w that makes the bound in (5) equal to 1− 2Q(α∗(β, µ)).
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that linear classifiers are optimal for this problem. The choice of w
provided by Lemma 1 specifies the orientation of the optimal classifier.
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4.1 Special cases
Matching norms for data and adversary: When B is the unit ball derived fromΣ, the optimization
problem (4) has a very simple solution: α∗(β, µ) = ‖µ‖Σ − β, y = αµ, z = βµ, and w =
1
‖µ‖ΣΣ
−1µ. Thus, the same classifier is optimal for all adversarial budgets. In general, α∗(0, µ) =
‖µ‖Σ and α∗(‖µ‖B, µ) = 0, but α∗(β, µ) can be nontrivially convex for 0 ≤ β ≤ ‖µ‖B. When
there is a difference between the two seminorms, the optimal modification is not proportional to µ,
which can be used by the adversary. The optimal classifier varies with the adversarial budget, so
there is a trade-off between accuracy and robust accuracy.
ℓ∞ adversaries: In Figure 2, we illustrate this phenomenon for an ℓ∞ adversary. We plot α(β, µ)
for Σ = I (so ‖ · ‖Σ = ‖ · ‖2) and taking B to be the ℓ∞ unit ball (so ‖ · ‖B = ‖ · ‖∞). In
this case (4) has an explicit solution. For each coordinate zi, set zi = min(µi, β), which gives
yi = µi−min(µi, β), which makes the constraints tight. Thus, as β increases, more components of
z equal those of µ, reducing the marginal effect of an additional increase in β.
Due to the mismatch between the seminorms governing the data and adversary, the value of β de-
termines which features are useful for classification, since features less than β can be completely
erased. Without an adversary, all of these features would be potentially useful for classification,
implying that human-imposed adversarial constraints, with their mismatch from the underlying ge-
ometry of the data distribution, lead to the presence of non-robust features that are nevertheless
useful for classification. A similar observation was made in concurrent work by Ilyas et al. [39].
5 Gaussian data: Sample complexity lower bound
In this section, we use the characterization of the optimal loss in the Gaussian robust classification
problem to establish the optimality of a rule for learning from a finite number of samples. This
allows for precise characterization of sample complexity in the learning problem.
Consider the following Bayesian learning problem, which generalizes a problem considered by
Schmidt et al. [68]. We start from the classification problem defined in Section 4. There, the choice
of the classifier h could directly depend on µ and Σ. Now we give µ the distribution N (0, 1
m
I). A
learner who knows this prior but not the value of µ is providedwith n i.i.d. labeled training examples
samples. The learner selects any measurable classification function hˆn : Rd → {−1, 1} by applying
some learning algorithm to the training data with the goal of minimizing E[L(N,P, hˆn)].
t
x
S(ρ, βρ)
S(ρ, 0)
S(0, βρ)
Figure 3: S(ρ, βρ) is the set appearing
in the statement of Theorem 3. S(ρ, 0)
corresponds to the loss lower bound ob-
tained by Schmidt et al.. S(0, βρ) corre-
sponds to the loss in the non-adversarial
version of this classification problem.
The optimal transport approach allows us to determine the
exact optimal loss for this problem for each n as well as
the optimal learning algorithm. To characterize this loss,
we need the following definitions. Let A be the ℓ2 unit
ball: {y ∈ Rd : ‖y‖2 ≤ 1}. Let S(α, β) = {(x, t) ∈
R
d × R : x ∈ tαA+ βB}.
Theorem 3. In the learning problem described
above, the minimum loss of any learning rule is
PrV∼N (0,I) [V ∈ S(ρ, βρ)], where ρ2 = m(m+n)n .
The proof is in Section C of the Appendix.
The special case where B is an ℓ∞ ball was considered
by Schmidt et al. [68]. They obtained a lower bound on
loss that can be expressed in our notation as Pr[V ∈
S(0, ρβ)]. This bound essentially ignores the random
noise in the problem and computes the probability that af-
ter seeing n training examples, the posterior distributions
forXn+1|(Yn+1 = 1) andXn+1|(Yn+1 = −1) are adver-
sarially indistinguishable. The true optimal loss takes into
account the intermediate case in which these posterior distributions are difficult but not impossible
to distinguish in the presence of an adversary.
Schmidt et al. investigate sample complexity in the following parameter regime: m = c1d
1
2 which
by design is a low noise regime. In this regime, they establish upper and lower bounds on sample
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Figure 4: Variation in minimum 0 − 1 loss (adversarial robustness) as β is varied for ‘3 vs. 7’. For
all datasets, the loss of a robustly classifier (trained with iterative adversarial training [54]) is also
shown for a PGD adversary with an ℓ2 constraint.
complexity of learning an adversarially robust classifier: C β
2d
log d ≤ n ≤ C′β2d. By taking into ac-
count the effect of the random noise, our characterization of the loss loses this gap. For larger values
ofm, the difference between Pr[Y ∈ S(0, ρβ)] and Pr[Y ∈ S(ρ, ρβ)] becomes more significant, so
our analysis is useful over a much broader range of parameters.
6 Experimental Results
In this section, we use Theorem 1 to find lower bounds on adversarial robustness for empirical
datasets of interest. We also compare these bounds to the performance of robustly trained classifiers
on adversarial examples and find a gap for larger perturbation values. For reproducibility purposes,
our code is available at https://github.com/inspire-group/robustness-via-transport.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We consider the adversarial classification problem on three widely used image datasets, namely
MNIST [50], Fashion-MNIST [82] and CIFAR-10 [47], and obtain lower bounds on the adversarial
robustness for any classifier for these datasets. For each dataset, we use data from classes 3 (PX1 )
and 7 (PX−1 ) to obtain a binary classification problem. This choice is arbitrary and similar results are
obtained with other choices, which we omit for brevity. We use 2000 images from the training set of
each class to compute the lower bound on adversarial robustness when the adversary is constrained
using the ℓ2 norm. For the ℓ∞ norm, these pairs of classes are very well separated, making the lower
bounds less interesting (results in Section D of the Appendix).
For the MNIST and Fashion MNIST dataset, we compare the lower bound with the performance of
a 3-layer Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) that is robustly trained using iterative adversarial
training [54] with the Adam optimizer [43] for 12 epochs. This network achieves 99.9% accuracy
on the ‘3 vs. 7’ binary classification task on both MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. For the CIFAR-10
dataset, we use a ResNet-18 [36] trained for 200 epochs, which achieves 97% accuracy on the binary
classification task. To generate adversarial examples both during the training process and to test
robustness, we use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) with an ℓ2 constraint, random initialization
and a minimum of 10 iterations. Since more powerful heuristic attacks may be possible against these
robustly trained classifiers, the ‘robust classifier loss’ reported here is a lower bound.
6.2 Lower bounds on adversarial robustness for empirical distributions
Now, we describe the steps we follow to obtain a lower bound on adversarial robustness for empirical
distributions through a direct application of Theorem 1. We first create a k × k matrix D whose
entries are ‖xi − xj‖p, where k is the number of samples from each class and p defines the norm.
Now, we threshold these entries to obtain Dthresh, the matrix of adversarial costs (cN ◦ c⊤N)(xi, xj)
(recall Section 3.2), whose (i, j)th entry is 1 if Dij > 2β and 0 otherwise, where β is the constraint
on the adversary. Finally, optimal coupling cost (CN ◦C⊤N )(PX1 , PX−1 ) is computed by performing
minimumweight matching over the bipartite graph defined by the cost matrixDthresh using the Linear
Sum Assignment module from Scipy [41].
In Figure 4, we show the variation in the minimum possible 0 − 1 loss (adversarial robustness) in
the presence of an ℓ2 constrained adversary as the attack budget β is increased. We compare this
loss value to that of a robustly trained classifier [54] when the PGD attack is used (on the same data).
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Until a certain β value, robust training converges and the model attains a non-trivial adversarial
robustness value. Nevertheless, there is a gap between the empirically obtained and theoretically
predicted minimum loss values. Further, after β = 3.8 (MNIST), β = 4.8 (Fashion MNIST) and
β = 1.5, we observe that robust training is unable to converge. We believe this occurs as a large
fraction of the data at that value of β is close to the boundary when adversarially perturbed, making
the classification problem very challenging.
We note that in order to reduce the classification accuracy to random for CIFAR-10, a much larger
ℓ2 budget is needed compared to either MNIST or Fashion-MNIST, implying that the classes are
better separated.
7 Related work and Concluding Remarks
We only discuss the closest related work that analyzes evasion attacks theoretically. Extensive recent
surveys [10, 51, 64] provide a broader overview.
Distribution-specific generalization analysis: Schimdt et al. [68] studied the sample complexity
of learning a mixture of Gaussians as well as Bernoulli distributed data in the presence of ℓ∞-
bounded adversaries, which we recover as a special case of our framework in 5. Gilmer et al. [33]
and Diochnos et al. [26] analyzed the robustness of classifiers for specific distributions, i.e. points
distributed on two concentric spheres and points on the Boolean hypercube respectively. In contrast
to these papers, our framework applies for any binary classification problem as our lower bound
applies to arbitrary distributions.
Sample complexity in the PAC setting: Cullina et al. [23], Yin et al. [85] and Montasser et al.
[56] derive the sample complexity needed to PAC-learn a hypothesis class in the presence of an
evasion adversary. These approaches do not provide an analysis of the optimal loss under a given
distribution, but only of the number of samples needed to get ǫ-close to it, i.e. to learn the best
empirical hypothesis.
Optimal transport for bounds on adversarial robustness: Sinha et al. [73] constrain the adversary
using a Wasserstein distance bound on the distribution that results from perturbing the benign distri-
bution and study the sample complexity of SGD for minimizing the relaxed Lagrangian formulation
of the learning problem with this constraint. In contrast, we use a cost function that characterizes
sample-wise adversarial perturbation exactly, which aligns with current practice and provide a lower
bound on the 0 − 1 loss with an adversary, while Sinha et al. minimize an upper bound to perform
robust training. Mahloujifar et al. [55] and Dohmatob [27] use the ‘blowup’ property exhibited by
certain data distributions to provide bounds on adversarial risk, given some level of ordinary risk.
In comparison, our assumptions on the example space, distribution, and adversarial constraints are
much milder. Even in regimes where these frameworks are applicable, our approach provides two
key advantages. First, our bounds explicitly concern the adversarial robustness of the optimal clas-
sifier, while theirs relate the adversarial robustness to the benign classification error of a classifier.
Thus, our bounds can still be nontrivial even when there is a classifier with a benign classification
error of zero, which is exactly the case in our MNIST experiments. Second, our bounds apply for
any adversarial budget while theirs become non-trivial only when the adversarial budget exceeds a
critical threshold depending on the properties of the space.
Possibility of robust classification: Bubeck et al. [13] show that there exist classification tasks
in the statistical query model for which there is no efficient algorithm to learn robust classifiers.
Tsipras et al. [79], Zhang et al. [87] and Suggala et al. [76] study the trade-offs between robustness
and accuracy. We discuss this trade-off for Gaussian data in Section 4.
7.1 Concluding remarks
Our framework provides lower bounds on adversarial robustness through the use of optimal transport
for binary classification problems, which we apply to empirical datasets of interest to analyze the
performance of current defenses. In future work, we will extend our framework to the multi-class
classification setting. As a special case, we also characterize the learning problem exactly in the case
of Gaussian data and study the relationship between noise in the learning problem and adversarial
perturbations. Recent work [30, 32] has established an empirical connection between these two
noise regimes and an interesting direction would be to precisely characterize which type of noise
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dominates the learning process for a given adversarial budget. Another natural next step would be to
consider distributions beyond the Gaussian to derive expressions for optimal adversarial robustness
as well as the sample complexity of attaining it.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
First, we present an easy lemma that uses our topological conditions on the neighborhood function.
Definition 4. A binary relationR ⊂ X ×Y , or equivalently a set-valued functionX → 2Y , is upper
hemicontinuous if it has the following property. For all open sets V ⊆ Y and points x ∈ X such
that R(x) ⊆ S, x has an open neighborhood U such that R(U) ⊆ V . Equivalently, RT (Y \ V ) is
closed.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the adversarial constraint function N is upper hemicontinuous, and N(x)
is nonempty and closed for all x ∈ X . Then the cost function cN ◦ cTN is lower semicontinuous.
Proof. For each point (x, x′) such that (cN ◦cTN )(x, x′) = 1, we will find an open neighborhoodwith
the same cost. Thus cN ◦ cTN is the indicator function of an open set and is lower semicontinuous.
The sets N(x) and N(x′) must be disjoint because (cN ◦ cTN )(x, x′) = 1. They are closed, andX ′ is a normal space, so they have disjoint open neighborhoods V and V ′. Because N is upper
hemicontinuous, x and x′ have open neighborhoodsU andU ′ such thatR(U) ⊆ V andR(U ′) ⊆ V ′.
Because V and V ′ are disjoint, cN ◦ cTN is one everywhere in U × U ′.
For the proof of Theorem 1 we need to use the concept of a cyclically monotone set [80].
Definition 5. A subset Γ ⊆ X × Y is said to be c-cyclically monotone if, for all n ∈ N and all
families of points (x, y) ∈ Γn ⊆ Xn × Yn,
n−1∑
i=0
c(xi, yi) ≤
n−1∑
i=0
c(xi, yi+1)
(with the convention yn = y0 ).
Proof of Theorem 1. Abbreviate cN ◦ cTN as c. From Lemma 2, the cost function c is lower-
semicontinuous. From Theorem 5.10 (ii), there is a set Γ ⊆ X×X that is measureable, is c-cyclically
monotone, and such that every optimal coupling is concentrated on it.
We need to find f, g : X → R such that c(x, y) ≥ g(y)−f(x) everywhere and c(x, y) ≤ g(y)−f(x)
for (x, y) ∈ Γ. The former propertymeans that f and g are admissible potentials and the latter means
that they are optimal in the dual transportation problem. A classifier h can be constructed from any
pair of admissible {0, 1}-valued potentials.
For all i ≥ 0, let
A0 = {x ∈ X : ∃y′ ∈ X s.t. c(x, y′) = 1, (x, y′) ∈ Γ}
A′i+1 = {y′ ∈ X : ∃x ∈ Ai s.t. c(x, y′) = 0}
Ai+1 = {x ∈ X : ∃y′ ∈ A′i+1 s.t. c(x, y′) = 0, (x, y′) ∈ Γ}
B0 = {y ∈ X : ∃x′ ∈ X s.t. c(x′, y) = 1, (x′, y) ∈ Γ}
B′i+1 = {x′ ∈ X : ∃y ∈ Bi s.t. c(x′, y) = 0}
Bi+1 = {y ∈ X : ∃x′ ∈ B′i+1 s.t. c(x′, y) = 0, (x′, y) ∈ Γ}
Further define A = ∪i≥0Ai, A′ = ∪i≥1A′i, B = ∪i≥0Bi, and B′ = ∪i≥1B′i. Observe that
A′ = {y ∈ X : ∃x ∈ A s.t. c(x, y) = 0} and B′ = {x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ B s.t. c(x, y) = 0}. If we
let g(y) = 1(B), then f(x) = 1(B′) = supy g(y) − c(x, y), i.e. the largest function such that
g(y)− f(x) ≤ c(x, y) everywhere. Alternative choices for f and g come from A and A′. If we let
f(x) = 1− 1(A), then g(y) = 1− 1(A′) = infx f(x) + c(x, y).
For all x ∈ A, there is some j and sequences (x0, · · · , xj−1) and (y′0, · · · , y′j−1) such that xj−1 = x,
xi ∈ Ai, and y′i+1 ∈ A′i+1 that witness this. Similarly, for all y ∈ B, there is some k and sequences
(x′0, · · · , x′k−1) and (y0, · · · , yk−1) such that yk−1 = y, yi ∈ Bi, and x′i ∈ B′i. Now we have
j−1∑
i=0
c(xi, y
′
i) +
k−1∑
i=0
c(x′i, yi) = 2
14
and
j−1∑
i=1
c(xi−1, y′i) +
k−1∑
i=1
c(x′i−1, yi) + c(x
′
0, y
′
0) + c(xj−1, yk−1) = c(x
′
0, y
′
0) + c(xj−1, yk−1).
From the cyclic monotonicity of Γ and the fact that c is always at most 1, c(x′0, y′0) =
c(xj−1, yk−1) = 1. Thus c(x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) ∈ A × B. This means that A and B′ are
disjoint and B and A′ are disjoint.
Now consider some (x, y) ∈ Γ. If c(x, y) = 1, then x ∈ A0, y ∈ B0, so (x, y) ∈ A × B. If
c(x, y) = 0, (x, y) is in one of A × A′, B′ × B, or (X \ A \ B′) × (X \ A′ \ B). We can now
easily check that for g(y) = 1(B) and f(x) = 1(B′), g(y)− f(x) = c(x, y) everywhere in Γ. The
choices g(y) = 1(X \A′) and f(x) = 1(X \A) work similarly.
Finally, we have
E[g(X−1)− f(X1)]
= Pr[h˜(X−1) = −1]− Pr[h˜(X1) 6= 1]
= 1− Pr[h˜(X1) 6= 1]− Pr[h˜(X−1) 6= −1]
= 1− Pr[h(X˜1) 6= 1]− Pr[h(X˜−1) 6= −1]
= 1− 2L(N, h, P ).
B Full Proof of Theorem 2
For a closed convex ball B ⊆ Rd, define the cone CB ⊆ Rd+1, CB = {(z, α) : α ≥ 0, z ∈ αB}.
Observe that CB is convex and for c ≥ 0, (z, α) ∈ CB implies (cz, cα) ∈ CB. Thus CB is indeed a
cone. From this, define the norm ‖z‖B = min{α : (z, α) ∈ CB}. Thus CB = {(z, α) : ‖z‖B ≤ α}.
For a cone C ⊆ Rd, the definition of the dual cone is C∗ = {y ∈ Rd : y⊤x ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ C}. A
pair (w, γ) ∈ C∗B if and only if w⊤z + αγ ≥ 0 for all (z, α) ∈ CB . It is enough to check the pairs
(z, ‖z‖B), which gives the condition−w⊤z ≤ ‖z‖γ.
This is very close to the ordinary definition of the dual norm. However, when B is not symmetric,
the minus sign matters. If 0 ∈ B, then (0, 1) ∈ CB and the constraint γ ≥ 0 applies to C∗B. However,
if 0 6∈ B, C∗B with contain points with negative γ components. In this case, there is no interpretation
as a norm.
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the following convex program:
(z, α, y, β) ∈ Rd+1+d+1
min aα+ bβ
(z, α, y, β) ∈ CB × CΣ
z + y = µ
The cone constraint is equivalent to ‖z‖B ≤ α and ‖y‖Σ ≤ β. The equality condition is equivalent
to µ− z − y ∈ {0}, the trivial cone.
The Lagrangian is
L = aα+ bβ − w⊤(z + y − µ)
=
(
0⊤ a 0⊤ b
)


z
α
y
β

− w⊤ (I 0 I 0)


z
α
y
β

+ w⊤µ
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The dual is
w ∈ Rd
maxµTw
(−w, a,−w, b) ∈ C∗B × C∗Σ
The cone constraint on w is trivial because the dual of {0} is all of Rd.
If we change the objective of the first program to use a hard constraint on α instead of including it
in the objective, the new primal is
(z, α, y, β) ∈ Rd+1+d+1
min bβ
(z, α, y, β) ∈ CB × CΣ
z + y = µ
α ≤ α′
the new Lagrangian is
L = bβ − w⊤(z + y − µ)− η(α′ − α).
The new dual is
(w, η) ∈ Rd+1
maxµTw − α′η
η ≥ 0
(−w, η,−w, b) ∈ C∗B × C∗Σ.
Rewriting without any cone notation, combining α with α′, and specializing to b = 1, we have
(z, y, β) ∈ Rd+d+1
minβ
‖z‖B ≤ α
‖y‖Σ ≤ β
z + y = µ
and
(w, η) ∈ Rd+1
maxµTw − αη
η ≥ 0
‖−w‖∗B ≤ η
‖−w‖∗Σ ≤ 1
From complementary slackness we have−w⊤z+ηα = 0 and−w⊤y+bβ = 0. From the constraints,
we have ‖z‖B ≤ α, ‖y‖B ≤ β, ‖−w‖∗B ≤ η, and ‖−w‖∗Σ ≤ b. We have w⊤z ≤ ‖w‖∗B‖z‖B and
w⊤y ≤ ‖w‖∗Σ‖y‖Σ. Combining these, all six inequalities are actually equalities.
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B.2 Simplification of transportation problem
From Theorem1,
CN ◦ C⊤N (PX1 , PX−1 ) ≤ inf
z∈βB
CTV (P˜X1 , P˜X−1), (6)
= inf
z∈βB
sup
A
P˜X1(A) − P˜X−1(A), (7)
= inf
z∈βB
sup
w
Ex∼N (µ−z,Σ) [1(w⊺x > 0)]− Ex∼N (−µ+z,Σ) [1(w⊺x > 0)]
(8)
= inf
z∈βB
sup
w
Q
(
w⊺z − w⊺µ√
w⊺Σw
)
−Q
(
w⊺µ− w⊺z√
w⊺Σw
)
, (9)
= inf
z∈βB
sup
w
2Q
(
w⊺z − w⊺µ√
w⊺Σw
)
− 1. (10)
As before, since the Q-function decreases monotonically, its supremum is obtained by find-
ing infw
w⊺z−w⊺µ√
w⊺Σw
. The infimum is attained at w∗ = 2Σ−1(z − µ) and its value is√
(z − µ)⊺Σ−1(z − µ), which implies that
CN ◦ C⊤N (PX1 , PX−1) ≤ inf
z∈βB
2Q
(√
(z − µ)⊺Σ−1(z − µ)
)
− 1. (11)
B.3 Connection to the classification problem
We consider the linear classification function fw(x) = sgn (w⊺x).
Classification accuracy: We define the classification problem with respect to the classification
accuracy E(x,y)∼P [1(fw(x) = y)] = P(x,y)∼P [fw(x) = y], which also equals the standard 0 − 1
loss subtracted from 1. The aim of the learner is to maximize the classification accuracy, i.e. the
classification problem is to find w∗ which is the solution ofmaxw P(x,y)∼P [fw(x) = y].
Performance with adversary: In the presence of an adversary, the classification problem be-
comes
max
w
P(x,y)∼P [fw(x+ h(x, y, w)) = y]
= max
w
1
2
Px∼N (µ,Σ) [fw(x+ h(x, 1, w)) = 1] +
1
2
Px∼N (−µ,Σ) [fw(x+ h(x,−1, w)) = −1] .
We will focus on the case with y = 1 for ease of exposition since the analysis is identical. The
correct classification event is then
fw(x+ h(x, 1, w)) = 1,
⇒w⊺(x+ h(x, 1, w)) > 0,
⇒w⊺x− w⊺ argmax
z∈βB
w⊺z > 0,
⇒w⊺x− max
z∈βB
w⊺z > 0
⇒w⊺x− β‖w‖∗ > 0,
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm for the norm associated with B. This gives us the classification accu-
racy for the case with y = 1 as maxw Ex∼N (µ,Σ) [1(w⊺x− β‖w‖∗ > 0)]. We now perform a few
changes of variables to obtain an expression in terms of the standard normal distribution. For the
first, we do x′ = x−µ, which gives usmaxw Ex′∼N (0,Σ) [1(w⊺x′ + w⊺µ− β‖w‖∗ > 0)]. The sec-
ond is x′′ = w⊺x′, which results in maxw Ex′′∼N (0,σ2) [1(x′′ + w⊺µ− β‖w‖∗ > 0)], where σ =√
w⊺Σw. Finally, we set x′′′ = x
′′
σ
, leading to maxw Ex′′′∼N (0,1)
[
1(x′′′ + w
⊺µ
σ
− β‖w‖∗
σ
> 0)
]
.
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Figure 5: Variation in minimum 0 − 1 loss (adversarial robustness) as β is varied for ‘3 vs. 7’.
For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the loss of a robustly classifier (trained with iterative adversarial
training) is also shown for a PGD adversary with an ℓ∞ constraint.
The classification problem is then
max
w
1
2
Px∼N (µ,Σ) [fw(x+ h(x, 1, w)) = 1] +
1
2
Px∼N (−µ,Σ) [fw(x+ h(x,−1, w)) = −1] ,
(12)
=max
w
Q
(
β‖w‖∗ − w⊺µ√
w⊺Σw
)
. (13)
Since Q(·) is a monotonically decreasing function, it achieves its maximum at w∗ =
minw
β‖w‖∗−w⊺µ√
w⊺Σw
. This is the dual problem to the one described in the previous section.
C Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 is below. The assumptions and setup are in Section 5 of the main paper.
Proof. Let µˆ = E[µ|((X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn)]. A straightforward computation using Bayes rule
shows thatXn+1 ·Yn+1|((X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn)) ∼ N (µˆ, I). Thus after observing n examples, the
learner is faced with a hypothesis testing problem between two Gaussian distributions with known
parameters. From Theorem 2, the optimal loss for this problem is Q(α∗(β, µˆ)).
Furthermore, µˆ = 1
m+n
∑n
i=1Xi and µˆ ∼ N (0, nm(m+n)I). Averaging over the training examples,
we see that the expected loss is
E[Q(α∗(β, µˆ))] = Pr[T ≥ α∗(β, µˆ)] = Pr[(µˆ, T ) ∈ S(1, β)] = Pr[Y ∈ S(ρ, ρβ)]
where T ∈ R, T ∼ N(0, 1) and V ∈ Rd+1, V ∼ N(0, I).
D Results for an ℓ
∞
adversary
In Figures 5a and 5b, we see that the lower bound in the case of ℓ∞ adversaries is not very infor-
mative for checking if a robust classifier has good adversarial robustness since the bound is almost
always 0, except at β = 0.5, in which any two samples can be reached from one another with zero
adversarial cost, reducing the maximum possible classification accuracy to 0.5. This implies that in
the ℓ∞ distance, these image datasets are very well separated even with an adversary and there exist
good hypotheses h. For MNIST (till β = 0.4) and Fashion MNIST (β = 0.3), we find that iterative
adversarial training is effective.
For the CIFAR-10 dataset 5c, non-zero adversarial robustness occurs after β = 0.2. However,
current defense methods have only shown robust classification with β up to 0.1, where the lower
bound is 0. In future work, we will explore the limits of β till which robust classification is possible
with neural networks.
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